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The Australian Bureau of Meteorology has predict-
ed an El Niño event in the Pacific Ocean later in 
2015. Large El Niño events have previously caused 
severe disruptions to village food production in 
Papua New Guinea (PNG), resulting in widespread 
hardship and hunger. This In Brief considers the 
possible impacts of a 2015–16 El Niño and suggests 
what can be done to address them. 
Despite greatly improved monitoring of 
the Pacific Ocean, ‘once an event is underway 
forecasting its duration and intensity are at 
best difficult’ (US Drought Mitigation Center). 
Nevertheless, the US Climate Prediction Center 
says ‘there is a greater than 90 per cent chance 
that El Niño will continue through Northern 
Hemisphere winter 2015–16 and around an 80 
per cent chance it will last into early spring 2016’ 
(9/7/2015).
If an El Niño event occurs in 2015, there is 
no sure way of predicting the severity of drought, 
frosts, and food shortages in PNG. A ‘warning’ 
index created from an analysis of PNG rainfall 
data from 1890 to 2010 successfully predicted only 
57 per cent of subsequent droughts (Cobon et al. 
2015). Even with these uncertainties, it is advisable 
to prepare for the likely impacts of an El Niño 
event in PNG.
How Does El Niño Affect Papua New Guinea 
Food Production?
Around 80 per cent of food consumed in PNG is 
grown there. A strong El Niño event reduces rainfall 
significantly in normally wet areas for some months 
and prolongs dry seasons. This is because PNG’s 
characteristically high rainfall is the outcome of 
low air pressure; upward movement of air in what 
is know as the Walker circulation; onshore winds 
crossing warm seas and picking up large amounts 
of moisture; and high mountain ranges forcing the 
warm, moist air up in altitude, where it cools and 
the moisture condenses and falls as rain. During a 
strong El Niño event, the western Pacific cools and 
the Walker circulation reverses, so that cool, dry, 
high-altitude air descends over PNG. The result 
is less-than-average rainfall for some months and 
significantly less cloud cover. At altitudes above 
2200 metres, the lack of cloud cover at night allows 
temperatures to fall to below zero and frosts to 
occur. Food production can be severely reduced as a 
result. 
Historical records reveal some of the impacts 
of El Niño. There were 11 droughts associated with 
El Niño events in PNG between 1896 and 1997, but 
severe disruptions to food and water were reported 
only in 1902, 1914, 1941, and 1997. In 1972, the 
Australian colonial administration, in ignorance 
of how high-altitude residents move to lower val-
leys in response to repeated frosts, decreed people 
should not move, and the Australian Defence Force 
(ADF) delivered food by helicopters. Following 
1972, stories of a more severe highlands food short-
age in 1941 began to be heard. A post-1972 exami-
nation of newspapers and administration reports 
found a probably even more severe event occurred 
in 1914 (Allen et al. 1989). But the pre-1972 docu-
mentary evidence was fragmentary and excluded 
the highlands, where there was no colonial admin-
istration until after 1945. 
The 1997 event was the most severe since 
1914. At altitudes above 1700 metres, repeated 
frosts killed all sweet potato — the staple food. At 
lower altitudes, newly planted swidden gardens 
failed because of lack of rain, and streams used to 
make sago dried up. Taro growers were forced to 
remove plants from gardens and place them near 
large streams to maintain planting stock. Wildfires 
destroyed villages and killed people and pigs. Large 
areas of montane forest trees killed by fire in 1997 
are still evident on highlands mountain ranges 
today. Forest fires disrupted long-fallow shifting 
cultivation systems between the Fly River and the 
Sepik River (D. Jorgensen pers. comm. 27/7/2015), 
where rainfall averages as much as 8000 millimetres 
per year. The Fly River became too shallow for 
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shipping, and Rouna hydro-power station was 
closed to preserve Port Moresby’s water supply.
By December 1997, national surveys of food 
and water found that over 260,000 people were eat-
ing ‘famine’ foods such as wild yams, tree leaves, 
and banana roots. A further 980,000 were eating 
small amounts of poor-quality garden food. Rural 
people survived by employing a number of strate-
gies: eating ‘famine’ food; purchasing imported 
food with cash raised by selling off pigs or from 
savings; moving to places where food was available; 
moving to towns to stay with relatives who had 
wage paying employment; and receiving rice, flour 
or cash from relatives in employment. Australia 
used ADF aircraft to reach 100,000 people without 
food, living in places only accessible by air.
In 1997, rainfall deficits were greatest furthest 
away from the equator, but the impacts of the food 
shortages on people were greatest in the poorest 
parts of the country. People with wage employment, 
with relatives in employment or with adequate sav-
ings, cared for themselves by purchasing imported 
food. The best evidence for this is rice import fig-
ures that show an increase of 66,000 tonnes in 
1997. Of this additional rice, 76 per cent was sold 
through retail outlets. The balance was purchased 
by the Japanese, Australian and PNG governments 
and was delivered as relief food (Allen and Bourke 
2001). Most people in PNG had the impression that 
Australia had rescued them from a catastrophe, 
though they had largely saved themselves (Allen 
and Bourke 2009).
What Can Be Done While We Wait to See What 
Happens?
The situation should be closely monitored. The 
signs of a developing food shortage are: a rise 
in sweet potato prices in highlands markets, 
an increase in retail rice sales and in imports, 
decreased flows in large rivers, press reports about 
rural food shortages, appeals for relief, and repeated 
frosts at higher altitude. These indications require: 
regular surveys of market prices, reporting of food 
import figures, and improved collection of mete-
orological data. Members of parliament should 
be discouraged from misreporting the need for 
relief food, and government should establish a 
cross-departmental committee (including the PNG 
Defence Force) to prepare in advance of a crisis 
(Barter 2001). The Australian Government should 
initiate dialogue with the heads of appropriate PNG 
Government departments and the PNGDF to estab-
lish procedures to be followed should Australia be 
required to respond. Much can be learned from 
the experiences of 1997–98, both from published 
reports and from the individuals, of both countries, 
who were involved.
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